Security
The authority to act is enforced outside the model.
Your data lives in infrastructure you run, your secrets stay out of the model’s prompt, and an action above your approval threshold waits for you. The model you choose still sees the prompts you send it.
Every control below says where it stops. The gaps are tracked in public, in a residual-risk roadmap.
01Shared responsibility
Sophon ships the controls. The deployment is yours.
02Credentials
The model never sees the secret.
Credential path, one sandboxed call
Model
the prompt
never holds itVault
runtime, encrypted at rest
credential (holds the credential at this step)Sandbox
the skill's container
API
the external service
Model prompt
- ask: create the calendar event
- credential: not here
The model proposes a tool call. Its prompt holds the request and, later, the result. The credential is part of neither.
Built-in tools skip the sandbox: the runtime makes the call outside the model context and returns only the sanitized result.
Where this stops: a compromised skill can read the credential it was given, and what it receives is the stored credential, not a short-lived scoped token. A broker that keeps the secret outside the sandbox is on the roadmap. Grant a skill only the connections it needs.
04Defense in depth
Seven layers, each with its edge marked.
Encrypted at rest: DPAPI-bound to your account on Windows, AES-256 under a local key file on macOS and Linux. HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, and Azure Key Vault on Enterprise.
Where it stops
On macOS and Linux the local key is a file on disk, not the OS keyring (R-06). It does not keep a credential away from a sandboxed skill that declared it (R-13).
Integrations prefer modern OAuth with proof keys. The token carries only the scopes you granted at connect time, and the runtime renews expired access tokens from the stored refresh token. Static credentials are a last resort.
Where it stops
Scope is fixed when you connect, not per call. Sophon does not mint short-lived or per-call scoped tokens; what is delivered is what is stored.
Every tool call is scored from None to Critical. You configure which levels run and which ask, down to the individual tool. The threshold ships at Medium, and Critical asks whatever you set it to.
Where it stops
No bulk-operation threshold yet: individually low-risk calls are not gated as a batch (R-12).
Every skill, bundled, marketplace, or self-authored, runs in a Docker container with CPU, memory, and time limits. gVisor kernel isolation applies where the runtime is configured.
Where it stops
Plugins are full-trust local processes, not sandboxed code. If Docker is unreachable and you enable process fallback, code runs as a child process with host network access.
Sandboxed skills have no network access by default. A skill reaches the network only through an allowlist declared in its manifest, and network tools are approval-gated.
Where it stops
Python that imports third-party packages enables network for that run to install them. Exfiltration to an allowlisted or public endpoint is not detected; there is no egress DLP (R-07).
Content that did not come from you is wrapped, scanned, and recorded. Off, Warn, or Block, admin-set for the host and shipping as Warn. Block stops a turn only on third-party content: a tool result, a webhook payload, a message from someone else.
Where it stops
It matches known phrasing, so treat it as a tripwire, not a boundary: obfuscated, split, or image-embedded instructions get through, and tools called through the embedded MCP server are not scanned (R-04).
Every action is logged: who triggered it, what happened, when, and the outcome. Enterprise adds compliance export, retention policies, and tamper-evident storage.
Where it stops
Tool parameters are hashed, so content-level exfiltration is not visible (R-02). Auth-failure and webhook signature-mismatch logging is partial (R-10).
05Threat model
Mapped to MITRE ATLAS, gaps included.
15 ATLAS tactics covered34 techniques mapped10 trust boundaries
06Supply chain
Check what you install. Our installers are not code-signed yet.
- Installers
- SHA-256, not code-signedInstallers we host list a SHA-256 checksum on their download page. The installers are not code-signed yet, so Windows SmartScreen and macOS Gatekeeper will warn the first time you run one. Signing is on the roadmap; until then the checksum is the check that the file is the one we built.
- Sophon Node
- SHA-256, not code-signedNode binaries are not code-signed either, so Windows and macOS treat them as software from an unidentified developer. Check the checksum before you run one.
- Marketplace skills
- Reviewed, checksum-verified, not signedAutomated static analysis and a mandatory human review of every version before publication. Every install is verified against a SHA-256 checksum and fails closed on a mismatch. Packages are not cryptographically signed yet (R-11).
- Plugins
- Full-trust, not signedNo container, no code signing, no resource limits. A plugin can do anything the Gateway's OS user can do, so install them from sources you trust.
- Third-party packages
- Out of scopeThe threat model covers first-party review. Supply chains of third-party packages beyond it are out of scope.
07Vulnerability disclosure
Found something? Tell us privately first.
Write to
security@buildersoft.ioInclude
- A description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce it
- Your assessment of the impact
- How to reach you
- Acknowledgement
- Within 48 hours.
- Coordinated disclosure
- Typically 90 days.
- Keep it private
- Not in public GitHub issues and not through the support form. Share proof-of-concept material privately so a fix can ship before details circulate.
The full policy is in the threat model. For anything that is not a vulnerability, use support.
08Documents
What your security review can read today.
- MITRE ATLAS threat modelTrust boundaries, technique coverage, detection coverage, and the residual-risk roadmap.PublicOpen MITRE ATLAS threat model
- Security documentationCredential vault, sandbox, prompt-injection defense, rate limiting, approvals.PublicOpen Security documentation
- Privacy policyWhat Buildersoft does and does not collect.PublicOpen Privacy policy
- Terms of serviceThe terms that govern your use of Sophon software and related services.PublicOpen Terms of service
- End user license agreementThe software license under which Sophon is used.PublicOpen End user license agreement
- Compliance and audit reportsUser access review, permission matrix, approval history, credential access, and more, generated by your own Enterprise deployment for your auditors.Your deploymentOpen Compliance and audit reports
- Security review materialAnything else your review needs. Ask, and we will tell you plainly whether it exists.On requestRequest Security review material
- Third-party attestationBuildersoft holds no SOC 2 report, ISO certificate, or other attestation of its own.Not held
Sophon ships the technical controls SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, and GDPR require. Certification applies to your deployment; Buildersoft holds no attestation of its own.
Bring us your security review.
Tell us how many people, on whose infrastructure, and what your reviewers need to see. We will walk through the controls, the limits, and the Enterprise tier with you.